Abstract: Recent case law demonstrates a significant difference in approach to the construction and validity of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses under the Brussels 1 bis regulation (Regulation 1215/2012), and its predecessors, by the courts in England and France. In this paper, the compatibility of such clauses with Article 25 of Regulation 1215/2012 is considered. The relevant case law of the French courts and the English courts is then analysed. The paper concludes that there are good commercial and legal reasons to uphold such clauses in a commercial context between parties of presumptively equal bargaining power. The doubts expressed by the French courts should therefore be set aside.
A. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the approach taken to asymmetric or one-sided jurisdiction clauses by courts in France and England. Such clauses are very common in international commerce and reflect the need of a financing party to be able to pursue the borrower/debtor where his assets are located. It will also be argued that they comply with Article 25 of EU Regulation 1215/2012 (the Brussels 1 bis Regulation). The French courts have, on the other hand taken a different approach; in particular, the Cour de cassation has expressed difficulties with such clauses as they are seen as contrary to the principle of legal certainty that lies at the heart of the Brussels 1 bis Regulation. In this paper, I will argue that the French approach is mistaken and that such clauses ought to be given effect to in a commercial setting. Clearly, other considerations come to the fore if one is dealing with weaker parties who are specifically protected by the Brussels 1 bis Regulation (ie consumers, insureds, employees).
An example of such a clause is provided by the Loan Market Association standard documentation:
1. Enforcement
Jurisdiction (a)
The courts of England have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement (including a dispute relating to the existence, validity or termination of this Agreement [or any non-contractual obligation arising out of or in connection with this Agreement]) (a 'Dispute').
* Associate, Slaughter and May, London.
(b) The Parties agree that the courts of England are the most appropriate and convenient courts to settle Disputes and accordingly no Party will argue to the contrary.
(c) This Clause 1.1 (Jurisdiction) is for the benefit of the Finance Parties only. As a result, no Finance Party shall be prevented from taking proceedings relating to a Dispute in any other courts with jurisdiction. To the extent allowed by law, the Finance Parties may take concurrent proceedings in any number of jurisdictions.
Such clauses have two characteristics. They are exclusive as regards the borrower who is required to sue the Finance Parties in England. However, the clause is non-exclusive as regards the Finance Parties who retain the right to sue in England or any other courts with jurisdiction. 1 Asymmetric jurisdiction clauses are also common (but not universal) in bond transactions, securitisations and secured financing transactions.
B. REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 25 OF REGULATION 1215/2012
Article 25 (1)- (2) Article 25(1). As to (A) the typical jurisdiction clause referred to above applies to the parties to the agreement. Point (B) will always be satisfied. As to (C) it is a factual matter whether agreement has been reached, although unless one party disputes the agreement alleging, for example, fraud, misrepresentation, force or duress applicable to the jurisdiction clause in question (rather than the contract in general) then there will be an agreement between the parties on jurisdiction. This follows from the independent nature of the jurisdiction clause from the rest of the contract. Referring to point (E), the agreement must confer jurisdiction. For the reasons given in the paragraph above, there is an express choice of the courts of England in any dispute between the debtor and the Finance Parties. As has been explained, there is no agreement by the debtor to submit to the jurisdiction of any other courts; there is simply a licence granted to the Finance Parties to sue the debtor in England or another court 'with jurisdiction'.
Point (G) requires that submission to jurisdiction applies to the 'particular legal relationship' concerned. In the case of the asymmetric jurisdiction clause referred to in section A above, the legal relationship is that created by the lending agreement. Whether the jurisdiction clause covers other claims will depend on its construction. However, for present purposes we are concerned with the core lending arrangement and not ancillary claims that might be brought which arguably fall outside the scope of the clause (eg claims for anticompetitive conduct). (H) specifies that that court shall have jurisdiction. Point (I) requires that the agreement on jurisdiction not be 'null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that Member State', ie the chosen jurisdiction including its rules of private international law. 2 For the reasons set out in section E, where the chosen jurisdiction is that of England there is no rule of English law or English private international law that impugns asymmetric jurisdiction clauses. [s]ince Article 17 of the Convention embodies the principle of the parties' autonomy to determine the court or courts with jurisdiction, the third paragraph of that provision must be interpreted in such a way as to respect the parties' common intention when the contract was concluded. The common intention to confer an advantage on one of the parties must therefore be clear from the terms of the jurisdiction clause or from all the evidence to be found therein or from the circumstances in which the contract was concluded'.
C. CASE LAW OF THE ECJ

5
It follows that:
[c]lauses which expressly state the name of the party for whose benefit they were agreed and those which, whilst specifying the courts in which either party may sue the other,
give one of them a wider choice of courts must be regarded as clauses whose wording shows that they were agreed for the exclusive benefit of one of the parties.
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There is no suggestion in this jurisprudence that there are any further requirements that must be met where a jurisdiction clause is concluded for the benefit of one party only.
D. CASE LAW OF THE COUR DE CASSATION
In The jurisdiction clause was void in its entirety because of its 'caractère potestatif à l'égard de la banque'. There are a number of points that are unclear from the ruling. First, it is unclear why Mme X was not able, as a consumer, to rely on the specific protections under Regulation 44/2001. Article 16(1) enables a consumer to bring proceedings against the other party to the contract in the courts where the consumer is domiciled or the other party is domiciled. As she was suing the French subsidiary of the bank and the bank, the latter would be a necessary party to the French proceedings. 10 Agreements on jurisdiction are only valid if entered into after the dispute has arisen, if they allow the consumer to bring proceedings in courts other than those indicated in Section 4 or if entered into by the consumer and the other party to the contract, both of whom are at the time of the conclusion domiciled or habitually resident in the same Member State, and which confers jurisdiction on the courts of that Member State. c'est certainement l'idée que face à la banque la cliente devait être protégée contre une clause instaurant un déséquilibre entre les parties, de la même manière que la loi prohibe les clauses abusives dans les contrats conclus avec les consommateurs, qui a inspiré la decision'. Article 17 of the Convention sets out to designate, clearly and precisely, a court in a Contracting State which is to have exclusive jurisdiction in accordance with the consensus formed between the parties, which is to be expressed in accordance with the strict requirements as to form laid down therein. The legal certainty which that provision seeks to secure could easily be jeopardized if one party to the contract could frustrate that rule of the Convention simply by claiming that the whole of the contract was void on grounds derived from the applicable substantive law.
The last interpretation of the judgment is that the concept of potestativité was seen as inherent in the Article 23 of Regulation 44/2001. This seems the best interpretation of the ruling that the clause 'revêtait un caractère potestatif à l'égard de la banque, de sorte qu'elle était contraire à l'objet et à la finalité de la prorogation de competence ouverte par l'article 23 du The case is significant as there was no possibility of the consumer provisions applying to Danne, either expressly or by analogy. It follows that the interpretation of Mme X suggested above as depending on her status as a consumer or quasi-consumer cannot be retained.
Moreover, the Cour de cassation did not rely on the substantive invalidity of the clause to hold it void. Nor was the concept of potestativité invoked as a reason for invalidating the clause.
19 Gaudemet-Tallon considers it regrettable that a reference was not made to the ECJ: Hélène Gaudemet- Tallon However, on the facts, the court held that the clause did not cover anti-competitive practices by Apple.
The difference between Danne and Apple lies in the fact that in the former Crédit Suisse reserved the right to institute proceedings 'devant « tout autre tribunal compétent »' whereas
Apple was limited to suing in Ireland, the place where the reseller had its seat or where a harm to Apple was occurring.
It is curious that these two cases were decided differently as 'any jurisdiction where a harm to Apple is occurring' is not necessarily any more certain than 'tout autre tribunal compétent'. In both cases the proceedings may be brought inside or outside Member States of the European Union or contracting states to the Lugano Convention. Secondly, in both cases the court must have jurisdiction over the reseller and the subject matter of the dispute under its rules of private international law. Thirdly, it is not clear ex ante which court will have jurisdiction as in Apple the place where a harm is occurring cannot be determined in advance but only at the time of the eventual litigation. The same applies to a jurisdiction clause assigning 'tout autre tribunal compétent' as once a jurisdiction is invoked it will have jurisdiction,
provided that it has jurisdiction over the parties under its own rules of private international law. on condition that the Charterer simultaneously appoints another process agent) the Charterer may not terminate the appointment of a process agent which has been appointed under this clause but, if such a process agent resigns or its appointment ceases to be effective, the Charterer within fourteen days thereafter shall appoint a new process agent. 47.08 A judgment relating to this Charterparty which is given or would be enforced by an English court shall be conclusive and binding on the Charterer and may be enforced without review in any other jurisdiction. 47.09 The Charterer shall have the same right to bring proceedings against the Owner in relation to the performance of its obligations hereunder, limited to bringing proceedings in the courts of England and the provisions of Clauses 47.07 and 47.08 apply equally mutatis mutandis to this clause as if they were set herein in full, changing 'Owner' to 'Charterer' and 'Charterer' to 'Owner' and, in relation thereto, the Owner hereby appoints WFW Legal Services Limited, presently of 15 Appold Street, London, EC2 as their process agent. 47.10 Any dispute arising from the provisions of this Charterparty or its performance which cannot be resolved by mutual agreement which the Owner determines to resolve by arbitration shall be referred to arbitration in London or, at Owner's option, in another city selected by the Owner by two arbitrators, one appointed by the Owners and one by the Charterers who shall reach their decision by applying English law. If the arbitrators so appointed shall not agree they shall appoint an umpire to make such decision. 47.11 Nothing in this clause shall exclude or limit any right which the Owner may have (whether under the law or any country, an international convention or otherwise) with regard to the bringing of proceedings, the service or process, the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or award or any similar or related matter in any jurisdiction. 47.12 In this clause 'judgment' includes order, injunction, declaration and any other decision or relief made or granted by a court.
E. CASE LAW OF THE ENGLISH COURTS
Charterers believed they had been overcharged and that Owners had been making a secret profit. They accordingly instituted proceedings against Owners in the English court.
Owners objected stating that they wanted the dispute referred to arbitration. It was argued by
Charterers that once proceedings had been started by court action Owners lost the right to refer the dispute to arbitration. Morison J rejected that contention:
I cannot accept that argument because it seems to me to contradict the commercial sense of the clause as a whole. Clause 47 is designed to give 'better' rights to Owners than to Charterers. Thus, although Charterers are limited to action in the English Court, Owners are given the right to bring proceedings in any court which has jurisdiction by virtue of a Convention and Charterers waive objections on grounds of forum non conveniens;
Charterers are required to provide a place for service within this jurisdiction whereas If Law Debenture starts an arbitration it would have waived its right (or option) to go by way of litigation. By the same token, if it participates sufficiently in an arbitration, it may well be held to have waived its rights to exercise its option. Subject to that, it has its clear rights. what would otherwise have been the effect of clause 24.1(a), which, if it had stood alone, would have required MCB to sue in England.
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Bank of New York Mellon v GV Films
I regard this as the natural construction of the sub-clause and the permissive language linking it to sub-clause (a) ('As a result the lender shall not be prevented…'). If there were any doubt, it would be necessary to keep in mind that it would be unlikely that the parties could have intended to submit their disputes to any court in the world however exorbitant. Indeed the Defendants' argument was that their construction, which bound them to litigation in any forum in the world of MCB's choosing, however inappropriate, was so unreasonable as to be invalid as contrary to English public policy. In the oft cited words of Lord Reid in Schuler:
'The fact that a particular construction leads to a very unreasonable result must be a relevant consideration. The more unreasonable the result the more unlikely it is that the parties can have intended it, and if they do intend it the more necessary it is that they shall make that intention abundantly clear.' (PCA). The PCA was governed by English law and the jurisdiction clause provided, so far as relevant:
[…] each of the parties irrevocably: (a) agrees for [C's] benefit that the courts of England shall have jurisdiction to settle any suit, action or other proceedings relating to this Agreement ('Proceedings') and irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of such courts (provided that this shall not prevent us from bringing an action in the courts of any other jurisdiction); and (b)
waives any objection which it may have at any time to the laying of venue of any Proceedings brought in any such court and agrees not to claim that such Proceedings have been brought in an inconvenient forum or that such court does not have jurisdiction over it. Blair J stated 'As is frequently agreed for good practical reasons in financing transactions, it stipulates that exclusivity in favour of one court does not prevent the financing institution from bringing an action in the courts of any other jurisdiction'. 41 However, as regards the client the clause was held to be an exclusive choice of the English courts:
There was a short debate in the skeleton arguments to whether such a clause can be regarded as 'exclusive'. The authority cited by Barclays was Continental Bank v Aeakos 
F. COMMERCIAL REASONS FOR ASYMMETRIC JURISDICTION CLAUSES
I now turn to discuss the commercial justification for the use of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses.
As mentioned above this discussion is confined exclusively to agreements entered into between commercial parties. Accordingly it does not touch on the special rules provided by Regulation when seised will determine the dispute between the parties. However, where one of the parties chooses to seise another court that court will have to determine in accordance with its rules of private international law whether it has jurisdiction. To the extent that the judgments of the Cour de cassation have regard to legal certainty and predictability it is clear that an asymmetric jurisdiction clause is no different from a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause. In fact, it is a clause that is exclusive as regards one of the parties (usually, the debtor) and non-exclusive as regards the other party (usually, the finance party).
Although most common in financing transactions, asymmetric jurisdiction clauses are also common in debt capital market transactions (eg bond issues). The issuer of the bonds will agree to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts. However, the clause typically goes on to provide that the submission 'is for the benefit of the Holders of the Instruments only. The commercial sense behind such a clause is clear. The debtor submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts. However, if the debtor has dissipated or transferred its assets elsewhere then the Holders of the Instruments may bring proceedings in any court 'with jurisdiction' where the assets are located. As it is not possible to specify in advance where the assets may be transferred it is accordingly impossible to limit the Holders to a defined list of jurisdictions as this would be an invitation to the debtor to transfer assets to another jurisdiction which may not recognise a judgment from one of the chosen courts.
For the same reasons asymmetric jurisdiction clauses are encountered in securitisation transactions. The investors will want to be sued in a single jurisdiction which will typically be exclusive. However, the trustee for the noteholders will wish to have flexibility where there is a dissipation or transfer of assets by the issuer elsewhere.
The same applies to secured financing. In such cases 'the clause offers the lender the choice between bringing a claim at the place of business of the borrower, of the guarantor or at the location of the collateral, a choice that if it were equally to benefit the borrower, would carry no compelling justification.'
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G. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that there are no compelling considerations that render such clauses uncommercial or unjustified in a contract negotiated between commercial parties. Of course, such clauses could be abusive in a consumer context, or in cases involving insurance contracts or individual employment contracts. It is for this reason that I have excluded them from the scope of this paper. However, where parties of presumptively equal bargaining power agree 48 a clause that is exclusive as regards one of the parties and non-exclusive as regards the other there is no valid reason not to hold the parties to their agreement.
